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Abstract
We develop a model where voters differ in their exogenous income and in
their ideological views, with racism as an illustration. Electoral competi-
tion, modeled à la Levy (2004), takes place between an endogenous number
of parties which propose platforms consisting of both an ideological and an
economic dimension. Our objective is to explain the emergence of minority
ideological positions (racist policies in our illustration), and to understand
the role played by political parties in this emergence. We first show that, in a
pure citizen-candidate model where parties are absent, the only equilibrium
consists of the majority ideological position. We then show that allowing for
the formation of political parties generates equilibria with minority ideologi-
cal positions. Our main result states that, if the economic issue is sufficiently
salient compared to the ideological one, all equilibria consist of a racist pol-
icy, and that the lowest degree of racism of these policies increases with the
proportion of poor people in the economy. Finally, our result suggests that
these minority ideological policies are more likely when the distribution of
income is very polarized.
JEL Code: D72
Keywords: electoral competition, political parties, racism, polarization,
salience.
1 Introduction
In recent years, several European countries have seen the emergence of ex-
treme right parties, who advocate policies with a strong xenophobic or racist
component. Paraphrasing a resolution adopted by the Political Affairs Com-
mittee of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly on 26 June 2003
(Document 9890):
The tendency today is for extremism to spread across the
European continent. In western Europe extremist parties and
movements have achieved significant electoral scores. In other
member countries of the Council of Europe political extremism
has also developed to a noticeable extent. [...] Extremism corre-
sponds to a form of political activity which rejects the principles
of parliamentary democracy, basing its ideology and its practices
on intolerance, exclusion, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and ultra-
nationalism.
Examples of such countries include France (where in 2002 the extreme
right candidate J.M. Le Pen made it into the second round of the Presiden-
tial elections), Denmark (where the ruling coalition formed by the Liberal
Party and the Conservatives has relied upon the Parliamentary support of the
anti-immigrant Danish People's party1), Austria (with Jorg Haïder's xeno-
phobic Freedom Party, which gathered a spectacular 27% of votes in the 1999
legislative election) and Belgium (where the Vlaamse Blok/Vlaamse Belang
has become the most popular party in Antwerp, the second largest city), to
name a few.
At the same time, it is not obvious that people/voters were becoming
more racist. Roemer and Van der Straeten (2004a) have looked at the dis-
tribution of immigration-related feelings among french voters in 1988, 1995
and 2002 (three Presidential election years) and have discovered a peak in
anti-immigration in 1995 (i.e., before the election where Le Pen made it into
the second round) and that these shifts over time are quite small.
One can also make the point that the majority of people is not racist
in Europe, including those countries. Roemer and Van der Straeten (2005)
quote a 1997 Eurobaromètre poll where people self declare how racist they
feel on a ten point scale. The proportion of people who declare themselves
moderately to very racist varies from less than 15% in Luxembourg to slightly
1As a consequence, the ruling coalition passed in May 2002 a law restricting the rights
of immigrants in many ways (stricter conditions for refugee status, for permanent-resident
status, for reunification with spouse or parents, etc.)
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less than 50% in Belgium and France. The average proportion of (moderate
to very) racist people in the EU-15 countries is below 40% and is larger than
one half in no EU-15 country.
This then prompts the following question: How can racist policies demo-
cratically emerge in societies where a majority of people is not racist? The
answer to this question is the central theme of the present paper. In partic-
ular, we are especially interested in ascertaining the role (if any) of political
party formation in this emergence. More generally, we are interested in shed-
ding light on the role that political party formation plays in allowing minority
ideological positions to be selected in democracies. Beyond racism, ideology
could also represent positions on abortion, stem cell research, gun control,
civil rights, or the importance of protecting individual liberties in the face of
terrorism.
To explore these issues, we propose a model in which political parties form
endogenously and propose policies that are two-dimensional, with an eco-
nomic component (redistributive taxation) and an ideological one. The po-
litical economy literature has shown that a two-dimensional electoral model
represents very well the electoral process in western democracies, and more-
over that the economic and ideological dimensions are precisely the two di-
mensions that play the most important role. Poole and Rosenthal (1991)
makes this point for the US, Laver and Hunt (1992) for 20 countries, and
Kitschelt (1994) for the main European countries for the past 30 years.
We have chosen to frame this paper in terms of racism, for two reasons.
First, because it is easier to be concrete and to write about racists rather
than holders of a minority ideological view. Second, because racism is a well
documented ideological dimension where a case can be made that minority
racist positions are sometimes enacted by democracies (see above). Racism
is also an important enough dimension to affect citizens' votes. Roemer and
Van der Straeten (2004a) show that, in France, for the three Presidential
elections prior to 2007, economic (unemployment, social inequalities) and
immigration and law-and-order issues were by far the two most common di-
mensions that voters say they take into account when deciding how to vote. A
similar result holds for Denmark, as shown by Roemer and Van der Straeten
(2004b). We would like to stress that, while the model is framed in terms
of racism, we believe that our results can be applied more generally to other
ideological dimensions. In other words, we view racism as an illustration of
more general results pertaining to party formation and ideological minority
views.
In our model, society is composed of four homogenous groups of voters,
which differ according to their preferences for both the economic policy (how
much to redistribute income) and the more or less racist policy. We as-
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sume that a majority of voters prefer a large redistributive system. This
is driven by the fact that the median income is below the average income
in virtually all countries. As for racism, we assume in accordance with the
above observations that a majority of people hold non-racist views. We do
not make any assumption about the correlation between preferences across
the two dimensions, except to assume that there are more non-racist than
racist people in all groups, whatever their preferences for redistribution.2
Party formation is modeled as in Levy (2004). Each group is repre-
sented by a single politician, a citizen-candidate whose only credible political
platform when running alone is the most-preferred policy of the group s/he
represents. These politicians may also coalesce and form parties. A central
assumption of Levy's model is that political parties provide a commitment
device to their members3: parties can commit to any policy that belongs to
the Pareto set of their members. Thus, the larger the membership of a party,
the larger the set of platforms it can credibly announce during the electoral
campaign. After the party structure is determined, parties compete in a
winner-takes-all election which in turn determines a racism/redistribution
policy for the economy.
To highlight the impact of party formation on the racism of equilibrium
policies, we first study the benchmark case in which politicians do not form
parties. As might have been expected from the distribution of preferences,
only non-racist redistributive policies emerge at equilibrium in the absence of
parties (Proposition 1). Proposition 2 then shows that, as soon as we allow for
party formation, we obtain equilibria where racist policies are proposed and
implemented with a strictly positive probability. Therefore, an implication
of our model is that party formation is a necessary (but admittedly not
a sufficient) condition for the emergence of minority ideological positions.
Finally, Proposition 3 states the main result of our paper: When the income
distribution is highly polarized, the only policies that emerge at equilibrium
are racist policies, and the minimum degree of racism of implemented policies
increases with the proportion of poor voters in the electorate. The basic
intuition for these results is that income polarization divides the non-racist,
thus causing the formation of parties in which racist politicians have a strong
bargaining power in the choice of electoral platforms. Also, the bargaining
power of the poor racist candidate increases with the proportion of poor
people, leading to a larger minimum level of racism at equilibrium.
2This assumption is stricter than necessary to obtain our results, but we do not mind
making it because it biases the model against the adoption of racist policies.
3Morelli (2004) also emphasizes the role of political parties as commitment devices.
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Related Literature
The paper closest to ours is Roemer (1998). We borrow its description of
the voters' preferences but we adopt a different way to model electoral com-
petition. The common theme between the two papers is that, in a two-
dimensional electoral competition model, if the saliency of one dimension is
large enough, political competition drives parties to compromise on the other
dimension. Roemer's objective is to explain why the poor do not expropriate
the rich  i.e., why a confiscatory tax rate is not proposed at equilibrium even
if it is the most-preferred economic policy of a majority of voters. Observe
that we could have phrased our paper in the same way: rather than focusing
on ideology we could have focused on the economic dimension and ask the
same question as Roemer's. Given the symmetry in the way we model the
two dimensions, we would have obtained that only non expropriation policies
emerge at equilibrium if ideology is salient enough.
Beyond this common theme, the mechanisms through which political
competition affects the equilibrium policies are very different in the two pa-
pers. First, Roemer's results depend crucially on the correlation between
preferences for taxation and for ideology in the voting population: his non-
expropriation result requires that the median income of the cohort of voters
with the median ideological view be larger than the average income in the
economy. By contrast, our results do not depend on the correlation between
preferences. Also, Roemer focuses on the equilibrium proposal of one party,
while our results pertain to any proposal played at equilibrium by any party.
Finally, Roemer assumes that parties are exogenous: there are two parties,
one representing poor non-racist voters while the other represents rich racist
voters (in our parlance). Unlike our paper, he does not focus on the impact
of endogenous party formation on the equilibrium.
Another related approach consists of the empirical contributions by Roe-
mer and Van der Straeten (2004a,2004b) and by Lee and Roemer (2005), who
develop a political competition model with a two-dimensional (economic and
ideological) policy space. In these papers, Roemer and his coauthors study
for three countries (France, Denmark and the US) how the anti-immigrant
(in the European case) or the racist (for the US) feelings among voters impact
the equilibrium position of parties on the economic issue. Their objective is
to calibrate a model of political competition (using party unanimity Nash
equilibrium as the political equilibrium concept) and to assess numerically
the impact of the ideological dimension on the equilibrium economic policy.
Two other papers have recently developed different political-economy
models where the presence of a second policy issue affects income redistribu-
tion. First, Austen-Smith and Wallerstein (2006) use a model of legislative
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politics to study the consequences of ethnic divisions for redistributive policy
choice. They show how the introduction of an additional policy dimension,
namely affirmative action, benefits the skilled members of both the majority
(white) and minority (black) group, but hurts unskilled whites and blacks.
Fernandez and Levy (2008) also examine how diversity in preferences over a
second policy dimension affects income redistribution between rich and poor.
Although they use a model of collective choice similar to ours, their problem-
atic is quite different. While members of both income classes disagree on a
(non-economic) race policy in our model, they assume instead that the poor
have opposing views on how tax revenues should be allocated across special-
interest projects (or targeted public goods). They show how increased taste
conflict among the poor first dilutes but then reinforces class interests.
Finally, Glaeser (2005) presents a signaling model in which politicians
spread hatred (anti-Black hatred, anti-Semitism ...) when their policies are
detrimental to an out-group because hatred creates a desire among voters to
harm that group. He thus shows that hatred will be spread against poor mi-
norities by anti-redistribution candidates, and spread against rich minorities
by pro-redistribution candidates.
2 The Model
We first describe the economic environment and then move to the electoral
competition aspects.
2.1 The Economic Model
Consider the following adaptation of the model introduced by Roemer (1998).
The economy is composed of four homogenous groups of voters, none of
which forms a majority. These groups are differentiated by their members'
pre-tax income, ω ∈ {ω`, ωh} with ω` < ωh, and most-preferred racial view,
ρ ∈ {ρ−, ρ+} with ρ− < ρ+. We assume, without loss of generality, that
the more racist individuals are those whose racial view is ρ+. Let Θ ≡
{ω`, ωh} × {ρ−, ρ+} be the type space, with generic element θji ≡ (ωi, ρj).
The fraction of the population that is of type θji is denoted by µji , where
µji < 1/2 for every i ∈ {`, h} and j ∈ {−,+}. The joint distribution of types
is fully described in Table 1.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
We assume that the poor and the non-racist are both majority coalitions:
µ` > 1/2 and µ− > 1/2. The first assumption is justified by the observation
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that the median income is below the average income in all OECD countries.
The second assumption comes from our desire to explain how a racist policy
may emerge even when a majority of voters does not hold such a position.
We further assume that the non-racists constitute a majority within both
income groups: µ−` > µ+` and µ−h > µ+h . Let ω¯ ≡ µ`ω` + µhωh denote the
mean income.
The government uses a proportional tax, t ∈ [0, 1], to finance a lump-sum
transfer to all citizens, T ≥ 0. The utility of an individual with racial view
ρ who consumes c and faces the government's racial position r is described
by c − α
2
(r − ρ)2, where α > 0 is the same for all individuals. Thus, using
the private budget constraint, c = (1− t)ω + T , and the government budget
constraint, tω¯ = T , we can represent the policy preferences of an individual
of type (ω, ρ) by the following indirect utility function:
u(t, r;ω, ρ) ≡ ω + t (ω¯ − ω)− α
2
(r − ρ)2. (1)
Let the policy space be P = [0, 1] × R, with generic element (t, r). The
indifference curves of the four groups are depicted in the upper left panel of
Figure 1.
In this economy, the collective choice of a public policy (t, r) is made
through electoral competition between endogenous political parties. We now
turn to the description of the electoral competition side of the model.
2.2 Political Parties and Elections
The modelling of electoral competition we adopt is that of Levy (2004).
We present that approach in the context of our paper, but refer the reader
to her paper for an in-depth discussion of the basic assumptions, and to the
appendix of the present paper for a more formal presentation of the concepts.
Each group of voters is represented by a single politician, labelled by θ ∈
Θ, who is a perfect representative of her group, in that her policy preferences
are given by (1). Politicians are unable to commit to campaign promises
before the election, so that a politician running alone can only propose her
ideal policy. The key assumption of Levy (2004) is, however, that politicians
can credibly commit to a larger set of policies by forming political parties
(or coalitions, to use the language of game theory): the set of policies which
a party can commit to is the Pareto set of its members. Formally, a policy
(t, r) ∈ P is in the Pareto set of party S ⊆ Θ, PS, if there is no other policy
(t′, r′) such that u (t′, r′; θ) ≥ u(t, r; θ) for all θ ∈ S and u(t′, r′; θˆ) > u(t, r; θˆ)
for some θˆ ∈ S.
The political game has two stages:
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1. Party formation: politicians get organized into political parties;
2. Electoral competition: parties compete in a winner-takes-all election.
The outcome of the first stage is then a partition of the set of politicians,
Θ, into a party structure, pi. The elements of pi, namely political parties,
play the electoral-competition game in the second stage. We first study the
electoral competition stage for a given party structure, before turning to the
determination of the equilibrium party structure.
Electoral Competition
Formally, a party is a non-empty subset of Θ. A party structure is a partition
of Θ into parties. Let Π be the set of party structures. The objective of
this subsection is to define the set of equilibria of the electoral-competition
game, should the competition commence from some arbitrary party structure
pi ∈ Π.
An electoral strategy (or platform) for party S ∈ pi is a policy choice
(tS, rS) ∈ PS ∪ {∅}, where ∅ means that the party proposes no policy (it
does not run). In the case where no party runs for election, every politician
receives a zero payoff. If at least one party runs, we assume that voters
record their preferences sincerely over any list of candidate platforms, p ≡
{(tS, rS)}S∈pi, and that the election is by plurality rule with no abstention.
The election outcome is then a fair lottery between the policies that get the
largest vote share.4 Given a party structure pi ∈ Π, a vector of electoral
strategies p = {(tS, rS)}S∈pi is a pi−equilibrium of the electoral-competition
game if no party S ∈ pi can make all its members better-off by deviating to
another platform (t′S, r′S) ∈ PS ∪ {∅}.
In line with Levy (2004), we assume that if a party is indifferent between
running and not running, it chooses not to run. We restrict ourselves to pure-
strategy equilibria that are partisan, in the sense that voters strictly prefer
their party's platform (if their party proposes one) to any other party's plat-
form. And to avoid repeatedly having to include the relevant qualification,
we leave it as understood that any reference to pi-equilibria is actually to
pure-strategy partisan pi-equilibria.
Any profile of electoral strategies induces an electoral outcome which, due
to the possibility of a tie, may be a lottery between several policies. Let ∆P
be the family of lotteries over the set of feasible policies, P . We finally denote
by δ : Π⇒ ∆P the correspondence which assigns to each partition pi the set
of electoral outcomes δ(pi) ⊆ ∆P that may result in a pi−equilibrium.
4Voters who are indifferent between several policies use a fair mixing device.
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Up to this point, we have taken the coalition structure as given. We now
turn to party formation.
Party Formation
Politicians anticipate the outcome from the electoral-competition stage, as
described above, when forming parties at the first stage. For any party
structure pi, however, there may exist multiple equilibria in the electoral-
competition game, and therefore multiple equilibrium outcomes (δ(pi) may
not be a singleton). Thus, pi may satisfy stability conditions for one electoral
outcome but not for others. As a consequence, we will not study the stability
of pi alone, but the stability of pairs (pi, ℘) satisfying ℘ ∈ δ(pi). We will refer
to them as political states. Which of these should be considered as the set
of equilibrium outcomes for the present model? The answer to this question
depends on the stability requirements imposed on party structures. In this
model, Levy (2004) uses a stability concept developed by Ray and Vohra
(1997). Relegating a formal presentation of this concept to the appendix, we
provide here the basic intuitions.
Let pi and pi′ be two party structures. pi′ is said to be induced from pi if
pi′ is formed by breaking a party in pi into two. Now, let S be a sub-coalition
of a party in pi. S is a deviator if it can induce some party structure pi′
from pi. An immediate consequence of this definition is that there can be no
deviators (and then no deviations) from the finest party structure pi0, which
consists of four singletons. Put differently, a pair (pi0, ℘) is regarded as stable
whenever ℘ ∈ δ (pi0). With this observation in mind, we can recursively
define the sequential notion of blocking of Ray and Vohra (1997): (pi′, ℘′) is
said to sequentially block (pi, ℘) if there exists a leading deviator in pi that can
suggest a sequence of deviations towards (pi′, ℘′) such that (i) (pi′, ℘′) cannot
be sequentially blocked; and (ii) at each intermediate step of the sequence of
deviations, some coalition has an incentive to induce the next step, because
all members of this coalition get a larger payoff with the final outcome (pi′, ℘′)
than in that intermediate state.
We thus define equilibrium political states as follows.
Definition 1 An equilibrium political state (EPS) is a pair (pi∗, ℘∗) ∈ Π×
∆P that satisfies the following conditions:
• ℘∗ ∈ δ(pi∗),
• there is no (pi, ℘) ∈ Π×∆P that sequentially blocks (pi∗, ℘∗).
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Thus, an equilibrium situation is defined as one that meets two require-
ments: first, the public policy results from the electoral competition between
existing political parties; second, in every existing party, politicians have no
incentive to break up their party in order to favor different electoral outcomes.
We are now in a position to apply this political equilibrium concept to
our economic environment.
3 Analysis of Equilibrium Political States
To highlight the impact of party formation on policy outcomes, we first focus
on equilibria where candidates decide individually whether to run or not for
elections, but where they do not have the possibility of forming parties.5 We
then study the equilibria when candidates can form parties.
3.1 Equilibria without Party Formation
Most of our conclusions depend on the salience of the redistribution issue
relative to the race issue. For our purposes, a useful measure of that saliency
is:
η ≡ ωh − ω`
α (ρ+ − ρ−)2 .
The saliency of the redistribution issue is affected by three factors: income
inequality, as measured by the difference between income levels, heterogeneity
in the views on racism, and the parameter α which measures the intensity of
the trade-off between ideological and economic positions. A low value of η
corresponds to the case where the difference in endowments is low compared
to the difference in racial views, and/or to the case where individuals care
a lot more about ideology than about redistribution (large value of α). In
other words, the ideological dimension is very salient while the economic
dimension has low saliency. More precisely, if η < 1/(2µ`), ideology matters
more than taxation for all voters, in the following sense: all individuals prefer
any policy with their most favored racial view to any policy with the opposite
racial view, whatever the tax rates in both policies:
u(t, ρi; θik) > u(t
′, ρj; θik),
for all 0 ≤ t, t′ ≤ 1, k = {`, h}, i, j ∈ {−,+} and i 6= j. This case is depicted
in the upper-right panel of Figure 1.
5This corresponds to the citizen candidate model of Osborne and Slivinski (1996).
Besley and Coate (1997) also study candidate entry but assume that citizens vote strate-
gically.
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[FIGURE 1 HERE]
On the other hand, if η > 1/(2µh), taxation is more salient than ideology
in that all individuals prefer any policy with their most favored taxation com-
ponent to any policy with the least preferred taxation component, whatever
the racism degree of both policies:
u(tk, r; θik) > u(1− tk, r′; θik),
for all k = {`, h}, tl = 1, th = 0, ρ− ≤ r, r′ ≤ ρ+, i, j ∈ {−,+} and i 6= j.
Indifference curves corresponding to that case are drawn in the lower-left
panel of Figure 1.
In the intermediate case where 1/(2µ`) < η < 1/(2µh), poor people care
more about ideology while rich people care more about taxation (see the
lower-right panel of Figure 1):
for all i, j ∈ {−,+} and i 6= j,we have{
u(t, ρi; θi`) > u(t
′, ρj; θi`), for all 0 ≤ t, t′ ≤ 1,
u(0, r; θih) > u(1, r
′; θih), for all ρ− ≤ r, r′ ≤ ρ+.
The reason why the threshold value of η is a function of µ` is the following.
Increasing the proportion of low income people decreases the average income
in the economy, which in turn means that poor people gain less from taxation
(making ideology relatively more important for them) while rich people lose
more from taxation (making this issue relatively more salient for them). Also,
our assumption that there are more poor than rich people (µ` > 1/2) results
in an average income closer to the income of the poor than of the rich, so
that the amount poor people gain from taxation is always lower (in absolute
value) than the amount rich people lose from taxation. This explains why,
whatever the value of η, there is no case where poor people care more about
taxation while rich people care more about ideology.
This discussion about the meaning of η will help understand the following
Proposition, which states formally that the only equilibrium without party
formation is the non-racist policy coupled with income confiscation.6
Proposition 1 Let ℘0 ∈ ∆P be defined by: ℘0 (1, ρ−) = 1. If η < 1
2µ`
or
η > 1
2µh
, then ℘0 is the unique pi0-equilibrium. If η ∈
(
1
2µ`
, 1
2µh
)
, then there
is no pi0-equilibrium.
6The proofs of all Propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
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The intuition for this result is the following. Individual candidates can
only commit to their most preferred policy, so we only have to consider
four policies. Whatever the value of η, policy (1, ρ−) is always majority
preferred to (0, ρ−) (with the support of all poor individuals) and to (1, ρ+)
(with the support of all non-racist voters). When η is low, all non-racist
voters prefer (1, ρ−) to (0, ρ+), while if η is high, all poor people prefer
(1, ρ−) to (0, ρ+). In both cases, (1, ρ−) is a Condorcet winner among the
four most preferred policies, and at equilibrium the candidate representing
poor non-racist individuals proposes this policy. On the other hand, if η has
an intermediate value, all voters except the poor non-racist prefer (0, ρ+)
to (1, ρ−). Since (0, ρ+) is beaten at the majority by (1, ρ+), there is no
Condorcet winner and no equilibrium with only one candidate running. We
further show in the Appendix that there is no equilibrium with more than
one candidate running, whatever the value of η.7
Proposition 1 has established that no racist policy can emerge at equilib-
rium in the absence of party formation. In the next subsection, we investigate
whether and how party formation may lead to racist policies (r > ρ−).
3.2 Equilibria with Endogenous Parties
In the previous subsection, we have shown that only the poor non-racist
politician's ideal policy may be implemented at equilibrium in the absence of
party formation. We stress this result not for its empirical plausibility, but
rather because it shows that party formation is needed to obtain political
equilibria with racist policies in our model. Party formation is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for the emergence of a different policy: equilibria
where parties form but where the equilibrium policy remains the same as
without parties exist in our framework. These situations are not interesting
for our purpose, which is to find the set of policies that can only emerge
when parties form. We then rather concentrate on EPS in which parties are
effective in the following sense (Levy, 2004): An EPS (pi, ℘) involves effective
parties if, and only if, ℘ /∈ δ (pi0).
We now show that there indeed exist EPS with racist policies. To favour
the emergence of policies other than the one most preferred by the poor
7We do not consider the cases where η = 1/(2µ`) or η = 1/(2µh) in this paper for
two reasons. First, these are zero-measure events. Second, allowing for these possibilities
renders the proofs much longer and more convoluted, with no gain in economic intuition.
We nevertheless point out that allowing for either case results in (knife-edged) distributions
of types and lotteries ℘ such that ℘ ∈ δ(pi0) and ℘(0, ρ+) > 0. For instance, if η = 1/(2µh)
and µh + µ+` /2 = µ−` + µ+` /2 = 1/2, the equiprobable lottery between (0,ρ+) and (1,ρ−)
is an equilibrium.
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non-racist, it is natural to first look at partitions where the other types
form parties, allowing them to enlarge the set of admissible (i.e., mutually
beneficial) policies. Formally, let Π−` ⊂ Π be the set of party structures pi,
pi 6= pi0, such that {θ−` } ∈ pi, i.e., in which the poor non-racist politician
stays on his own while other types coalesce into one or two parties. We then
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 For any η > 0, there exists an EPS (pi, ℘) such that pi ∈ Π−` ,
and ℘(t, r) > 0 for some policy (t, r) with r > ρ−.
This proposition shows that there is always room for a party to form and
enable its members to escape the tyranny of the poor non-racist politician.
But the existence of EPS with effective parties is not the sole implication
of this proposition. Indeed, it also says that allowing for party formation
guarantees the existence of an EPS in which a racist policy is implemented
with positive probability.
The proof of this result runs as follows. We first show that the only
non-racist policy other than (1, ρ−) that can be proposed with Π−` is (0, ρ−),
because non-racist policies with a positive tax rate do not belong to the
Pareto set of any party that does not include the poor non-racist. We then
show that no party can win outright with policy (0, ρ−), which establishes
that, if an EPS with effective parties exists, it implies that ℘(t, r) > 0 for
some policy (t, r) with r > ρ−. We finally prove the existence of such EPS by
showing that, if an EPS with effective parties does not exist for the partition
consisting of three parties, then it surely exists for the partition where all
politicians join a single party that runs against the poor non-racist candidate.
Proposition 2, however, does not exclude the existence of EPS in which
non-racist policies (with r = ρ−) are implemented. With this as motivation,
we now look for conditions on the saliency index, η, under which only racist
policies are implemented with positive probability in an EPS.
Taxation saliency influences equilibrium policies both at the electoral
competition stage (for a given party structure) and at the party forma-
tion stage. Before stating the main result of this paper, we first illustrate
from an intuitive viewpoint how issue saliency impacts the electoral com-
petition stage, for a given party structure. We consider party structure
pi1 ≡ {{θ+h , θ+` } ,{θ−` } ,{θ−h }}, where a party made of both racist types
competes against the two non-racist candidates. Racist politicians coalesce
into one party because this enables them to enlarge the set of admissible plat-
forms to all most racist policies, whatever their tax component (the Pareto
set for the two racist politicians is made of policies (0 ≤ t ≤ 1, ρ+)). The
equilibrium policies with this party structure depend crucially on the relative
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salience of both issues. If taxation is very salient compared to ideology (i.e.,
if η is high enough), the only EPS that emerge have the racist party running
alone and proposing the most racist policy ρ+ together with some positive
tax rate (that falls short of full income confiscation).8 The intuition for this
result goes as follows. The racist party running alone is an EPS if none of the
most preferred policies of the two non-racist politicians ((0, ρ−) and (1, ρ−))
is preferred by both non-racists to the policy offered by the racist party. If
taxation is very salient, the two non-racist politicians are too divided on the
tax issue to agree on one of those two extreme non-racist policies.
On the other hand, if taxation is not very salient (i.e., if η is low enough),
no such EPS exists (because the two non-racists can agree on a unanimously
preferred policy), but there may exist equilibria with the three parties run-
ning, so that the equilibrium consists of an equiproportional lottery between
two non-racist policies with extreme taxation components and one most racist
one with positive taxation. The link between issue saliency and this three-
policy lottery runs as follows. When the taxation issue is salient enough, the
rich (resp. poor) racist feels closer to the policy most preferred by the rich
(resp. poor) non-racist than by his fellow racist politician, so that, what-
ever the policy that the racist party proposes, at least one of the two racist
politicians prefers the policy proposed by his fellow non-racist. This in turn
means that the situation where the three parties run can not be a partisan
equilibrium when η is high enough. Alternatively, if the main dividing line is
ideology, racist politicians can compromise and find a policy that they both
prefer to the non-racist policies with extreme taxation. An equilibrium with
the three parties winning may then exist.
The study of party structure pi1 illustrates how taxation saliency results
in racist equilibrium policies at the electoral competition stage, by making it
impossible for non-racists to coordinate and oppose the racist party policies.
This in turn has an impact on the party formation stage, where candidates
anticipate the bargaining power gained by racist politicians when they form a
party together with at least one non-racist politician. Since racist politicians
can credibly threaten to leave any such party whose proposal does not give
them at least the utility level they obtain with the pi1 racist equilibrium, they
can force non-racist fellow party members to compromise on racism.
These two channels through which a high taxation saliency feeds into
more political power for the racist politicians constitute the driving forces
behind the next proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose µhη ≥ 1. There exists a strictly increasing thresh-
old function r¯ : (1/2, 1) → (ρ−, ρ+), with limµ→1 r¯(µ) = ρ+, such that the
8The precise statement and proof is given in Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
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following statement is true: If (pi∗, ℘∗) is an EPS with effective parties, then
any policy (t, r) ∈ P such that ℘∗(t, r) > 0 satisfies r ≥ r¯(µ`).
This proposition states formally the main result of the paper, namely
that, when the tax issue is very salient, all EPS with effective parties ex-
hibit a racist policy (in that r > ρ−), while the minimum degree of racism
of implemented policies increases with the proportion of poor in the citi-
zenry. The intuition for the first part of this result is the one discussed
previously. Taxation saliency favours racist policies through two channels.
First, it divides poor and rich non-racist politicians, thus enabling successful
agreements between racist politicians. Second, given that such agreements
are possible, they endow racist politicians with a strong bargaining power (or
threat of deviation) in parties made of both racist and non-racist members,
thus forcing the latter to compromise and accept racist policies.
We now present the intuition as to why the minimum equilibrium degree
of racism increases with the proportion of poor people. The key channel for
this result is that the bargaining power of the poor racist politician increases
with µl. To see this, we look at the partition pi1 described above, where
a party made of the two racist politicians competes against two non-racist
parties. The proof of Lemma 2 shows that the upperbound on the equilibrium
tax rate proposed by the racist party in pi1 is given by the constraint that the
rich non-racists prefer the policy proposed by that party (t, ρ+) to the most-
preferred policy of the poor non-racist (1, ρ−). An increase in µl, causing a
decrease of the average income ω¯, makes redistribution more costly to the
rich non-racist, whose utility under policy (1, ρ−) decreases so much that she
is ready to accept a policy (t, ρ+) with a larger t from the racist party. This
makes the poor racist politician better-off with partition pi1, and consequently
raises her bargaining power in all partitions where racist candidates belong
to the same party (i.e., partitions from which pi1 can be induced). This in
turn increases the minimum degree of racism among all EPS.
The result described in Proposition 3 is important from a positive per-
spective: it says that, even if a majority of citizens is non-racist, an extreme
race policy may be democratically chosen in a society where the income
distribution is highly polarized. Indeed, our discussion of the parameter η
in Subsection 3.1 has shown that it increases with the difference between
income levels. In the context of our model, Esteban and Ray (1994)'s polar-
ization measure is strictly increasing in ωh − ω` and µh (keeping µh < 1/2),
which both have to be large for the above proposition to hold.9 Furthermore,
9In the context of our paper, polarization is given by
Polω ≡
[
(1− µh)1+α µh + µ1+αh (1− µh)
]
(ωh − ω`) ,
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Lemma 2 in the appendix formally shows that, under the same condition,
there exists an infinity of EPS in which the extremist race policy r = ρ+
is enforced with probability 1. However, a word of caution is in order. Al-
though income polarization is conducive to the adoption of racist policies,
there is no clear relationship between polarization and the degree of racism
of all equilibrium policies. More precisely, if income polarization is large
enough, Proposition 3 applies and all equilibrium policies are (more or less)
racist. On the other hand, increasing µh increases polarization but decreases
the lower bound on racism described in Proposition 3. In short, income po-
larization implies racist policies, but increasing polarization also opens the
door to less racist policies.
4 Concluding Remarks
We develop a model where voters differ in their views about income redistri-
bution and about ideology, with racism as an illustration. We assume that
a majority of voters has lower-than-average income and favours full income
taxation, and that the majority of voters hold non-racist views.
Electoral competition, modeled à la Levy (2004), takes place between an
endogenously determined number of parties which propose platforms consist-
ing of both an ideological and an economic dimension. We first show that, in
a pure citizen-candidate model where parties are absent, the only equilibrium
consists of the majority ideological (i.e., non-racist), full confiscation policy.
We then show that allowing for the formation of political parties generates
equilibria with minority ideological policies. Finally, our main result is that,
if the economic issue is sufficiently salient compared to the ideological one,
all equilibria consist of a racist policy, and that the lowest degree of racism
of these policies increases with the proportion of poor people in the economy.
These results are consistent with the observation in many European coun-
tries of xenophobic parties and policies even though a majority of European
voters does not hold such views. Moreover, our approach generates testable
implications concerning the link between the ideological component of equi-
librium policies and income distribution. Our model suggests that racist
policies are more likely when the distribution of income is very polarized, in
the sense of Esteban and Ray (1994). To the best of our knowledge, there is
no empirical study of the relationship between ideological policies (on issues
such as racism, abortion, stem cell research or gun control) and polarization,
but we hope that our model will inspire empirical testing.
with α ∈ (0, α∗] where α∗ ' 1.6 (Theorem 1 in Esteban and Ray, 1994).
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We have chosen to concentrate on the impact of party formation on the
equilibrium ideological policies. We could rather focus on the other dimen-
sion, namely the extent to which income redistribution prevails at equilib-
rium. With this perspective, our model helps answering the question as to
why the poor do not expropriate the rich. Our answer then complements
that of Roemer (1998): only non expropriation policies emerge at equilibrium
if ideology is salient enough.
Although framed in terms of ideology and redistribution, the model we
develop is actually more general in the sense that its main ingredients can
be found in other contexts. These ingredients are: people are heterogeneous
along two dimensions and electoral competition à la Levy takes place over
two dimensions. People have extreme preferences in the sense that there
are only two most preferred policies on each dimension. Since policies are
bundled (i.e., a political platform is a two-dimensional policy), we have four
types of most preferred two-dimensional policies. Our main results can then
be reinterpreted more generally. First, in the absence of parties, the only
equilibrium policy is the Condorcet winner among the four most preferred
policies (we show that it may happen that there is no Condorcet winner,
in which case there is no equilibrium, even though there is always an issue-
by-issue, majority voting equilibrium). Second, allowing for the formation
of parties generates equilibria with interior policies, even though not a sin-
gle voter most prefers such policies. In that sense, political parties are the
main vehicles for compromise in our model. Third, we give conditions over
the saliency of issues that guarantee that the most preferred policy of the
majority (on one issue) is never part of the equilibrium.
Appendix
Preliminary Definitions
We use the following notation:
pi1 ≡ {{θ+h , θ+` } ,{θ−` } ,{θ−h }} , pi2 ≡ {{θ+h , θ−` } ,{θ+` } ,{θ−h }}
pi3 ≡ {{θ+h , θ−h } ,{θ+` } ,{θ−` }} , pi4 ≡ {{θ+` , θ−` } ,{θ+h } ,{θ−h }}
pi5 ≡ {{θ+` , θ−h } ,{θ+h } ,{θ−` }} , pi6 ≡ {{θ−` , θ−h } ,{θ+h } ,{θ+` }}
pi7 ≡ {{θ+h , θ+` , θ−` } ,{θ−h }} , pi8 ≡ {{θ+h , θ+` , θ−h } ,{θ−` }}
pi9 ≡ {{θ+h , θ+` } ,{θ−` , θ−h }} , pi10 ≡ {{θ+h , θ−` , θ−h } ,{θ+` }}
pi11 ≡ {{θ+h , θ−` } ,{θ−h , θ+` }} , pi12 ≡ {{θ+h , θ−h } ,{θ+` , θ−` }}
pi13 ≡ {{θ+` , θ−` , θ−h } ,{θ+h }} , pi14 ≡ {{θ+h , θ−h , θ−` , θ+h }}
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For each S ⊆ Θ, and any policy (t, r) ∈ P , define the sets PS(t, r),
P¯S(t, r), I(t, r), and I¯(t, r) as
PS(t, r) ≡
{
(t′, r′) ∈ P{θ+h ,θ−h ,θ−` ,θ+h } : u (t
′, r′, θ) > u(t, r, θ) , ∀θ ∈ S
}
P¯S(t, r) ≡ PS(t, r) ∩ PS
IS(t, r) ≡
{
(t′, r′) ∈ P{θ+h ,θ−h ,θ−` ,θ+h } : u (t
′, r′, θ) = u(t, r, θ) , ∀θ ∈ S
}
I¯S(t, r) ≡ IS(t, r) ∩ PS.
The Model of Party Formation
We first define formally the equilibrium concept used for the second-stage
game, and then the notion of sequential blocking in the context of our paper.
pi-equilibria
Let pi ∈ Π be the party structure. Given any party S ′ and any profile of
electoral strategies p ≡ {(tS, rS)}S∈pi, let VS′ (p) denote that party's realized
vote share. The election outcome is then a fair lottery between the policies in
W (p) ≡ {(tS, rS) : S ∈ argmaxS′∈pi VS′(p)}. As a consequence, the expected
utility of politician θ resulting from a profile of strategies p is given by
U(p, θ) ≡ 1|W (p)|
∑
(tS ,rS)∈W (p)
u (tS, rS; θ)
if there is at least one party S ∈ pi such that (tS, rS) 6= ∅, and U(p, θ) = 0
otherwise.
Given a party structure pi ∈ Π, a vector of electoral strategies p =
{(tS, rS)}S∈pi is a pi−equilibrium of the electoral-competition game if, for
all S ∈ pi, there is no (t′S, r′S) ∈ PS, (t′S, r′S) 6= (tS, rS), that satisfies
U ((t′S, r
′
S) ,p−S; θ) ≥ U ((tS, rS) ,p−S; θ)
for all θ ∈ S, with at least one strict inequality. Note that, following Levy
(2004), we restrict attention to pure-strategy equilibria.
Sequential Blocking
Consider pi ∈ Π, and suppose that an equilibrium political state (EPS, for
short) has already been defined for all party structures that are refinements
of pi. Let ℘ ∈ δ(pi). (pi′, ℘′) is said to sequentially block (pi, ℘) if there exists
a sequence {(pi1, ℘1) , . . . , (pim, ℘m)} such that:
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1. (pi1, ℘1) = (pi, ℘), (pim, ℘m) = (pi′, ℘′) and for every j = 2, . . . ,m, there
is a deviator Sj that induces pij from pij−1. Moreover, for every j,
℘j ∈ δ (pij).
2. (pi′, ℘′) is an EPS.
3. (pij, ℘j) is not an EPS for any ℘j ∈ δ (pij) and j = 2, . . . ,m− 1.
4. for all j = 1, . . . ,m− 1, and θ ∈ Sj:∑
(t,r):℘′(t,r)>0
℘′(t, r)u (t, r; θ) >
∑
(t,r):℘j(t,r)>0
℘j(t, r)u (t, r; θ) .
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Assume that η < 1/(2µl). We treat sequentially the cases where 4, 3, 2
and 1 parties run at equilibrium.
(i a) 4 parties running. Our assumptions on µij (i ∈ {−,+}, j ∈ {l, h})
rule out the case where the four parties tie when running.
(i b) 3 parties running. If either θ−h or θ−l does not run, our assumption
that µ− > 1/2 makes it impossible for the three running parties to tie for
victory. If θ+l does not run, θ−l prefers not to run and obtain policy (0, ρ−)
for sure to running and obtaining an equiprobable lottery between (0, ρ+),
(1, ρ−) and (0, ρ−). Similarly, if θ+h does not run, θ−h prefers not to run
and obtain policy (1, ρ−) for sure to running and obtaining an equiprobable
lottery between (1, ρ+), (1, ρ−) and (0, ρ−). Hence, there is no equilibrium
with 3 parties running.
(i c) 2 parties running. Observe that binary majority voting over the set
of the four most preferred policies gives the following transitive social order:
(1, ρ−) Â (0, ρ−) Â (1, ρ+) Â (0, ρ+) where (t′, r′) Â (t, r) means that a strict
majority of voters strictly prefer (t′, r′) to (t, r). It is then impossible for any
two parties to tie for victory.
(i d) 1 party running. Given the transitive social order described above,
policy (1, ρ−) is a Condorcet winner among the four most preferred policies,
and thus no party can enter and win when θ−l runs alone, and no other party
can run alone, otherwise θ−l would enter and win. Hence, ℘0 is the unique
equilibrium.
(ii) The case where η > 1/(2µh) is proved in like manner.
(iii) Assume that 1/(2µl) < η < 1/(2µh).
(iii a) 4 parties running. Same argument as in (i a) above.
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(iii b) 3 parties running. If either θ−h or θ+h does not run, our assumption
that µ−l > µ+l makes it impossible for the three running parties to tie for
victory. If θ−l does not run, option (0, ρ−) wins for sure since µ− > 1/2. If
θ+l does not run, θ−l prefers not to run and obtain policy (0, ρ−) for sure to
running and obtaining an equiprobable lottery between (0, ρ+), (1, ρ−) and
(0, ρ−). Hence, there is no equilibrium with 3 parties running.
(iii c) 2 parties running. Unlike in cases (i) and (ii) above, binary majority
voting over the set of the four most preferred policies does not generate a
transitive social order. We nevertheless have that whatever the two policies
(ti, ri) ∈ {0, 1}×{ρ−, ρ+}, i = 1, 2 with (t1, r1) 6= (t2, r2), a strict majority of
voters strictly prefer (t1, r1) to (t2, r2) or the opposite. It is then impossible
for any two parties to tie for victory.
(iii d) 1 party running. Given that binary majority voting over the set
of the four most preferred policies is not transitive, there is no Condorcet
winner among this set, and whatever party runs may be defeated by at
least one entrant. Hence, there is no equilibrium with 1 party running, and
δ(pi0) = ∅.
Proof of Proposition 2
First of all, note that Π−` = {pij}j=1,3,5,8. Let Ej, j ∈ {1, 3, 5, 8}, be the
(possibly empty) set of values of η such that there exists an EPS (pij, ℘) with
℘ 6= ℘0. We now make a useful claim.
Claim: Suppose η ∈ Ej, j ∈ {1, 3, 5, 8}. Then for any EPS (pij, ℘j), there
exists a policy (tj, rj) such that rj > ρ− and ℘j (tj, rj) > 0.
Proof: From the definition of Ej, it suffices to show that, for every
j ∈ {1, 3, 5, 8}, there is no party offering policy (0, ρ−) and winning with
probability 1 in a pij-equilibrium (if t ∈ (0, 1), then (t, ρ−) /∈ P¯S, ∀S ∈ pij).
Consider party structure pi1. In this structure, (0, ρ−) only belongs to the
Pareto set of {θ+` }. But it can never win for sure by offering that policy.
Indeed, this would mean that it runs alone, which is impossible in a pi1-
equilibrium: {θ−` } could deviate and offer (1, ρ−), thus enforcing its ideal
policy. A completely similar argument applies to pi3, pi5, and pi8.
It results from the claim that Proposition 2 holds if ∪j=1,3,5,8Ej = R+.
We now show that η /∈ ∪j=1,3,5Ej implies η ∈ E8, thus proving the result.
To see this, note that, when η /∈ ∪j=1,3,5Ej, a deviation from structure pi8
is either impossible (δ(pij) = ∅,∀j = 1, 3, 5), or leads to policy (1, ρ−) with
probability 1. As P¯{θ+h ,θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−) 6= ∅, any (pi8, ℘) satisfying ℘(t, r) = 1
for some (t, r) ∈ P¯{θ+h ,θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−) ⊆ δ (pi8) is therefore an EPS in such a
situation. Since r > ρ− for all (t, r) ∈ P¯{θ+h ,θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−), η must belong to
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E8.
Proof of Proposition 3
Before we proceed to a proof of Proposition 3, the following preliminary
lemmas are useful.
Lemma 1 Let η > 1
2µh
. For every j ∈ {2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 12}, (pij, ℘) is an EPS
if and only if ℘ (1, ρ−) = 1.
Proof: Suppose η > 1/2µh.
When j = 2, 4, 6, the lemma is obvious: if the equilibrium outcome differs
from (1, ρ−), then politician θ−` can profitably deviate to pi0, thereby enforcing
her ideal policy. Moreover, as (1, ρ−) is a Condorcet winner in the set of ideal
policies when η > 1
2µh
, it is easy to see that there is no profitable deviation
when the two-member party runs alone and offers (1, ρ−).
Let us turn to party structure pi3. From the assumption that µ−` > µ+` ,
there cannot be a pi3-equilibrium in which the three parties are running (a
tie is impossible). Moreover, for every policy (t, r) ∈ P{θ+h ,θ−h }, (1, ρ
−) is a
Condorcet winner in {(1, ρ−)} ∪ P{θ+h ,θ−h }, and a majority of citizens strictly
prefer (1, ρ+) to (t, r). As a consequence, there is no pi3-equilibrium in which
two parties choose to run, and (1, ρ−) is the unique pi3-equilibrium outcome.
Consider now pi10. Here again, there cannot be a tie between
{
θ+h , θ
−
` , θ
−
h
}
and
{
θ+`
}
. As P¯{θ+h ,θ−` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
+) is non-empty,
{
θ+`
}
running alone cannot
be a pi10-equilibrium. What about
{
θ+h , θ
−
` , θ
−
h
}
running alone? It is easy
to check that there is an infinity of policies (t, r) such that
{
θ+h , θ
−
` , θ
−
h
}
running alone and offering (t, r) is a pi10-equilibrium, among which is (1, ρ−).
However, as politician
{
θ−`
}
can induce pi3 (and then (1, ρ−)), (pi10, ℘) is an
EPS if and only if ℘ (1, ρ−) = 1.
Finally, (pi12, (1, ρ−)) is the unique EPS involving pi12. To see this, note
first that such an EPS must involve party
{
θ+` , θ
−
`
}
running alone (µ` > µh).
As P¯{θ+` ,θ−` }(t, r) = P{θ+` ,θ−` } for any (t, r) ∈ P{θ+h ,θ−h }, (1, ρ
−) ∈ δ (pi12) =
P{θ+` ,θ−` }. Moreover, if the policy offered by party
{
θ+` , θ
−
`
}
differs from
(1, ρ−), politician θ−` can profitably break up her party and then induce
pi3. Our previous results show that no political state can sequentially block
(pi12, ℘◦), thus proving that (pi12, ℘◦) is the only EPS involving pi12. This
completes the proof of Lemma 1.
¤
20
Lemma 2 If µhη ≥ 1, then
(i) ℘ ∈ δ (pi1) and ℘(t, r) > 0 imply that (t, r) ∈ P{θ+h ,θ+` }, and
(ii) Any (pi1, ℘) with ℘ (t, ρ+) = 1 and t ∈ (t¯2, t¯1), where
t¯1 ≡ 1− 1
2ηµ`
, and t¯2 ≡ 1− 1
2ηµh
,
is an EPS.
Proof: When 2µ`µhη(> µhη) ≥ 1, the set P{θ+h } (0, ρ
−) ∩ P{θ+` } (1, ρ
−)
is empty. As a consequence, whenever the three parties run, at least one
member of party
{
θ+h , θ
+
`
}
prefers the policy offered by a rival party to that
offered by her own party. It is therefore impossible for a pi1-equilibrium in
which the three parties run to be partisan when µhη ≥ 1.
Given the party structure pi1, statement (i) is not true only when either{
θ−h
}
or
{
θ−`
}
win with a positive probability. We now show that this is not
possible when η > 1
2µhµ`
.
As a majority of citizens strictly prefer (1, ρ−) to (0, ρ−), the strategy
profiles {∅, (1, ρ−) , (0, ρ−)} and {∅,∅, (0, ρ−)} cannot be pi1-equilibria.
Now, suppose that a profile of the form {(t, ρ+) , (1, ρ−) ,∅} is a pi1-
equilibrium. For this equilibrium to be partisan, politician θ+` must prefer
(t, ρ+) to (1, ρ−) or, equivalently, t > t¯2, and there must be a tie between
the two running parties (voters of type θ−h must be indifferent): ℘ (t, ρ+) =
℘ (1, ρ−) = 1/2. Then, by continuity, party
{
θ+h , θ
+
`
}
can improve upon ℘
by offering a platform (t− ε, ρ+) with ε arbitrarily small. Doing so, it woos
θ−h -voters away from party
{
θ−`
}
and makes all its members strictly better-
off. As a consequence, {(t, ρ+) , (1, ρ−) ,∅} is not a pi1-equilibrium. We could
prove in like manner that a profile of the form {(t, ρ+) ,∅, (0, ρ−)} cannot be
a pi1-equilibrium.
Finally, {∅, (1, ρ−) ,∅} cannot be a pi1-equilibrium. Indeed, party {θ+h , θ+` }
can enter and win with the platform (t− ε, ρ+) described above. This com-
pletes the proof of (i).
Let us now turn to statement (ii). From the above argument, we know
that if ℘ ∈ δ (pi1), then there exists (t, r) ∈ P{θ+h ,θ+` } such that ℘(t, r) = 1.
This corresponds to a platform profile {(t, ρ+) ,∅,∅}. But this platform is a
pi1-equilibrium only if parties
{
θ−`
}
and
{
θ−h
}
have no profitable deviations.
As µ− > 1/2, offering (1, ρ−) is a profitable deviation for
{
θ−`
}
whenever
θ−h -voters prefer (1, ρ−) to (t, ρ+) or, equivalently, t ≥ t¯1 (the inequality may
be strict depending on the distribution of types). Similarly, as µ` > 1/2,
offering (1, ρ−) is a profitable deviation for
{
θ−`
}
whenever θ+` -voters prefer
(1, ρ−) to (t, ρ+) or, equivalently, t ≤ t¯2.
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Finally, party
{
θ−h
}
cannot profitably deviate if θ−` -voters strictly prefer
(t, r) to (0, ρ−) or, equivalently,
t > t¯3 ≡ 1
2ηµh
.
As t¯2 = max {t¯2, t¯3} < t¯1 when µhη ≥ 1, {(t, ρ+) ,∅,∅} is a pi1-equilibrium
whenever t ∈ (t¯2, t¯1). Furthermore, (pi1, ℘) is an EPS since neither θ+h nor θ+`
can profitably induce pi0 when t > t¯2.
¤
Lemma 3 Suppose 2µhη > 1 and let r¯ ≡ µ`ρ+ + µhρ−. Then (pi5, ℘) is an
EPS whenever ℘ (t, r¯) for some t ∈ (t¯4, t¯5), where
t¯4 ≡ 1− 1− µ
2
h
2µhη
, and t¯5 ≡ 1− µ`
2η
.
Moreover, (pi5, ℘) is an EPS only if ℘ (t, r¯) = 1 for some t ∈ [t¯4, t¯5].
Proof: Our assumptions on the distribution of citizens' types (µ` > 1/2
and µ− > 1/2) do not allow pi5-equilibria of the form {(t, r), (0, ρ+) , (1, ρ−)}.
As any (t, r) ∈ P¯{θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−) 6= ∅ is preferred to (1, ρ−) by θ+h -voters,
strategy profiles of the form {(t, r),∅, (1, ρ−)} and {∅,∅, (1, ρ−)} cannot
be pi5-equilibria. Similarly, (t, r) ∈ P¯{θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−) is preferred to (0, ρ+)
by θ−` -voters, so that strategy profiles of the form {(t, r), (0, ρ+) ,∅} and
{∅, (0, ρ+) ,∅} cannot be pi5-equilibria.
Moreover, {∅, (0, ρ+) , (1, ρ−)} is not a pi5-equilibrium since {θ−` } would
win for sure.
Thus, only profiles of the form {(t, r),∅,∅} are candidate to be pi5-
equilibria. Noting that
P¯{θ+` ,θ−h }
(
1, ρ−
)
= {(t, r¯) : t ∈ (t¯4, t¯5)} ,
we obtain the first statement of the lemma. To see that the second statement
is also true, just note that
{
θ−`
}
can profitably deviate by offering (1, ρ−)
whenever (t, r) does not belong to the closure of P¯{θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−).
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Lemma 4 Suppose 2µhη > 1. Then
(i) if (t, r) ∈ P¯{θ+h ,θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−) and ℘(t, r) = 1, then ℘ ∈ δ (pi8); and
(ii) (pi8, ℘) is not an EPS, for all ℘ ∈ δ (pi8).
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Proof: (i) Our assumptions on the distribution of types prevent a tie
between the two parties. Any platform profile of the form {(t, r),∅}, with
(t, r) ∈ P¯{θ+h ,θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−), is a pi8-equilibrium since
{
θ−`
}
has no profitable
deviation. This proves (i).
Moreover, if (t, r) does not belong to the closure of P¯{θ+h ,θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−),
then
{
θ−`
}
can profitably deviate by offering (1, ρ−) (doing so, it wins for
sure). As a consequence, the set of electoral outcomes (t, r) arising in EPS
involving pi8 is a subset of the closure of P¯{θ+h ,θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−).
(ii) Suppose (pi8, ℘) is an EPS. Then there exists (t, r) such that ℘(t, r) =
1. By definition of an EPS, no coalitional deviation is possible at (pi8, ℘).
In particular,
{
θ−h , θ
+
`
}
cannot profitably deviate to some EPS (pi5, ℘′). As
P¯{θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−) ⊂ P¯{θ+h ,θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−), this implies by Lemma 3 that r = r¯
and t ∈ [t¯4, t¯5].
But, using Lemma 3 again, politician θ+h can induce pi5 and thus enforce
(t− ε, r¯) for some ε arbitrarily small. Obviously, such a deviation is feasible
only if t > t¯4. As a consequence, (pi8, ℘) is an EPS only if (t, r) = (t¯4, r¯) (if
(t¯4, r¯) /∈ δ (pi5), then a deviation by θ+h always occurs).
However this is also impossible. Indeed, coalition
{
θ+h , θ
+
`
}
can induce pi1,
and thus enforce a policy (t¯4, ρ+) that makes its members strictly better-off.
By Lemma 2, this deviation is feasible since t¯4 ∈ (t¯2, t¯1). As a result, there
is no EPS involving pi8.
¤
We now complete the proof of Proposition 3. First of all, let P1 ⊂ P be
defined as
P1 ≡
{
(t′, r′) ∈ P{θ+h ,θ+` ,θ−` } : ∀t ∈ (t¯2, t¯1) ,
(
t, ρ+
)
/∈ P¯{θ+h ,θ+` }(t
′, r′)
}
and define the threshold function r¯ : (1/2, 1)→ (ρ−, ρ+) as
r¯ (µ`) ≡ min {r : (t, r) ∈ P1}
= ρ+ −
(
1− µ`
µ`
)1/2 (
ρ+ − ρ−) > ρ−.
The idea is now to check that, for every j = 1, . . . , 14, the following statement
is true:
(Pj) Suppose µhη > 1. If (pij, ℘) is an EPS with effective parties, then any
policy (t, r) ∈ P such that ℘(t, r) > 0 satisfies r ≥ r¯(µ`).
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(Pj) is evidently true for j ∈ {2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 12} since we know from Lemma
1 that parties cannot be effective in those structures. Let us now turn to the
other party structures.
• j = 1
As any (t, r) ∈ P{θ+h ,θ+` } satisfies r = ρ
+, statement (i) in Lemma 2 shows
that (P1) is true.
• j = 5
Given that r¯ > r¯(µ`), (P5) is directly proved by Lemma 3.
• j = 7
Since a tie between the two parties is impossible (µ` + µ+h > µ−h ), a pi7-
equilibrium involves one of them running alone. To see that {∅, (0, ρ−)} is
not a pi7-equilibrium when µhη > 1, consider for instance a deviation by
party
{
θ+h , θ
+
` , θ
−
`
}
from ∅ to (t¯6, µ`ρ− + µhρ+) where
t¯6 ≡ µh (1 + 2µ`)
2ηµ`
.
It is easy to check that t¯6 ∈ P¯{θ+h ,θ+` ,θ−` } (0, ρ
−) and then that {∅, (0, ρ−)} is
not a pi7-equilibrium.
Consider now platform {(t, r),∅}, with (t, r) ∈ P{θ+h ,θ+` ,θ−` }. Under what
conditions is (pi7, ℘), with ℘(t, r) = 1, an EPS? Party structures pi1, pi2, and
pi4 can be induced from pi7. Note first that θ+` can induce pi2, and we know
from Lemma 1 that (pi2, ℘) is an EPS if and only if ℘(1, ρ−) = 1. Therefore
(t, r) must be in P{θ+h ,θ+` ,θ−` } ∩ Pθ+` (1, ρ
−) ⊃ P1. Moreover,
{
θ+h , θ
+
`
}
can
induce pi1 and then, by Lemma 2, any policy (t, ρ+) such that t ∈ (t¯2, t¯1).
Consequently, a necessary condition for (pi7, ℘) to be an EPS is that (t, r) ∈
P1. This proves (P7).
• j = 8
Part (ii) of Lemma 4 proves (P8).
• j = 9
As µ− > 1/2, a tie between the two parties is impossible. And since
(1, ρ−) is the most-preferred policy of politician θ+` in P{θ−` ,θ−h }, (pi
9, ℘) is
an EPS only if ℘ (1, ρ−) = 1. Otherwise, θ+` would induce pi6 and then,
by Lemma 1, (1, ρ−). But parties are not effective in such an EPS. This
establishes (P9).
• j = 11
Consider first an EPS (pi11, ℘) in which a single party is running. This
implies that ℘(t, r) = 1 for some (t, r) ∈ P{θ+h ,θ−` } ∪ P{θ−h ,θ+` }. As θ
+
` and
θ−h can both induce pi2 (and then (1, ρ−)), a necessary condition for (pi11, ℘),
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℘ 6= ℘0, to be an EPS is consequently
(t, r) ∈ P2 ≡
[
P{θ+` }
(
1, ρ−
) ∪ I{θ+` } (1, ρ−)]∩[P{θ−h } (1, ρ−) ∪ I{θ−h } (1, ρ−)] .
If (t, r) ∈ P2 ∩
(
P{θ+h ,θ−` } ∪ P{θ−h ,θ+` }
)
, then either r = r¯ > r¯ (µ`) or
r = µhρ
+ + µ`ρ
−. Moreover, for any (t, r) such that r = µhρ+ + µ`ρ−, there
exists (t′, r′) ∈ P¯{θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−) such that politician θ+h strictly prefers (t′, r′)
to (t, r). As she can enforce (t′, r′) by inducing pi5, (pi11, ℘) is an EPS only if
r > r¯ (µ`).
Consider now an EPS in which both parties are running (a tie). If they
offer the same platform, then they are both indifferent between running and
not running. According to our initial assumption, they should consequently
choose not to run. If they offer different policies, then it is easy to check that
the pi11-equilibrium under consideration is not partisan. This ends to prove
(P11).
• j = 13
Given the distribution of types, any pi13-equilibrium is of the form {(t, r),∅},
with (t, r) ∈ P{θ+` ,θ−` ,θ−h }. But P{θ+` ,θ−` ,θ−h } can be partitioned as P{θ+` ,θ−` ,θ−h } =
P3 ∪ P4 ∪ P5, where
P3 ≡
{
(t, r) ∈ P{θ+` ,θ−` ,θ−h } : u
(
t, r, θ+`
)
< u
(
1, ρ−, θ+`
)}
P4 ≡
{
(t, r) ∈ P{θ+` ,θ−` ,θ−h } : u
(
t, r, θ−h
)
< u
(
1, ρ−, θ−h
)}
,
and
P5 ≡ P2 ∩ P{θ+` ,θ−` ,θ−h }.
Let (pi13, ℘) be an EPS such that ℘(t, r) = 1 for some (t, r) ∈ P{θ+` ,θ−` ,θ−h }. As{
θ+` , θ
−
`
}
can enforce (1, ρ−) by inducing pi4, (t, r) /∈ P3. Similarly,
{
θ−` , θ
−
h
}
can enforce (1, ρ−) by inducing pi6, so that (t, r) /∈ P4. As a result, policy
(t, r) must be an element of P5. As P5 ⊆ P2, we can use the same argument
as for j = 11 to show that r = r¯, thus proving (P13).
• j = 14
Many party structures can be induced from pi14 but here, we just need to
focus on three of them: pi8, pi12, and pi13.
Let us start with pi13. Under what conditions is (pi13, ℘) with ℘(t, r) = 1
an EPS? We have just seen that (t, r) must belong to P5, with r = r¯. In
step j = 13, we envisioned all possible deviations except that of θ−` to pi5.
Actually, politician θ−` has a profitable deviation from such a (t, r¯) if and
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only if t < t¯5. Indeed, in such a case, she can profitably induce pi5 and then
(t+ ε, r¯). As a consequence, (pi13, ℘) is an EPS if and only if ℘ (t¯5, r¯) = 1.
Let us now return to pi14. Suppose (pi14, ℘14) is an EPS. Then θ+h has no
profitable deviation to pi13; that is,
℘14(t, r) = 1⇒ (t, r) ∈ P{θ+h }
(
t¯5, µ`ρ
+ + µhρ
−) ∪ I{θ+h } (t¯5, µ`ρ+ + µhρ−) .
(2)
Furthermore, coalition
{
θ+` , θ
−
`
}
must not have an incentive to induce pi12,
and then (1, ρ−); formally,
℘14(t, r) = 1⇒ (t, r) ∈ P{θ+` }
(
1, ρ−
) ∪ I{θ+` } (1, ρ−) . (3)
(Obviously, θ−` always agrees with such a deviation.)
Now, assume that (t, r) satisfies (2) and (3), and that r < µ`ρ+ + µhρ−.
This implies that (t, r) ∈ P{θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−) \ P¯{θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−). But this in turn
implies that there exists a policy (t′, r′) ∈ P¯{θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−) that is strictly
preferred to (t, r) by the members of
{
θ+` , θ
−
h
}
and by θ+h . We now prove
that (pi5, ℘′), with ℘′(t′, r′) = 1, sequentially blocks (pi14, ℘14); a contradiction
implying that r ≥ µ`ρ++µhρ− > r¯ (µ`) and thus completing the proof of the
proposition.
As all politicians in
{
θ+h , θ
+
` , θ
−
h
}
strictly prefer (t′, r′) to (t, r), there exists
an ε > 0 such that: (i) all politicians in
{
θ+` , θ
−
h
}
also strictly prefer (t′, r′)
to (t′, r′ + ε), and (ii) (t′, r′ + ε) ∈ P¯{θ+h ,θ+` ,θ−h } (1, ρ
−). Moreover, the second
part of Lemma 4 tells us that there is no EPS involving structure pi8. The
following sequence of deviations is then feasible: first,
{
θ+h , θ
+
` , θ
−
h
}
induces
pi8 and (t′, r′ + ε) (see (i) in Lemma 4), and then
{
θ+` , θ
−
h
}
induces pi5 and
(t′, r′).
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Figure 1: Policy Preferences and the Saliency of the Redistribution Issue
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Table 1: Distribution of types 
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